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A distributed coordination mechanism for supply
networks with asymmetric information
Abstract
The paper analyses the problem of coordination in supply networks of mul-
tiple retailers and a single supplier, where partners have asymmetric, private
information of demand and costs. After stating generic requirements like dis-
tributedness, truthfulness, efficiency and budget balance, we use the apparatus
of mechanism design to devise a coordination mechanism that guarantees the
above properties in the network. The resulting protocol is a novel realisation of
the widely used Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) where the responsibility of
planning is at the supplier. We prove that together with the required generic
properties a fair sharing of risks and benefits cannot be guaranteed. We illus-
trate the general mechanism with a detailed discussion of a specialised version,
assuming that inventory planning is done according to the newsvendor model,
and explore the operation of this protocol through computational experiments.
Keywords: Supply chain management, Vendor Managed Inventory, game
theory, mechanism design, asymmetric information
1. Introduction
Supply networks are large and complex systems, characterised by the exis-
tence of numerous competitive enterprises, dynamic structures, uncertain knowl-
edge, asymmetric information structure, and difficult planning and decision
making problems. The uncoordinated actions in such a system lead to sub-
optimal performance, exemplified in a simple case by the well-known prisoners’
dilemma. In supply networks this phenomenon is called double marginalisation:
since every enterprise concerns its own profit when making decisions, the aggre-
gate benefit is in general lower than if the enterprises were vertically integrated
and centrally controlled. This suboptimality manifests itself in waste of mate-
rials, labour, energy and other environmental resources, and eventually causes
significant financial losses, too. Hence, analysing the interactions of autonomous
enterprises and designing coordination methods that are applicable and useful
also in the industrial practice are some of the most compelling challenges of
operations management today (Va´ncza et al., 2011).
In a vertically integrated supply network with multiple retailers and a sup-
plier, centralising the replenishment and inventory management decisions at
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the supplier’s side is advantageous compared to the situation where each re-
tailer has to decide individually. This centralisation approach is called risk
pooling, and it is proved to result both in lower average inventory levels and
safety stocks (Simchi-Levi et al., 2000).
In order to use the idea of risk pooling in vertically non-integrated networks,
the Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) business model is applied frequently in
the practice. In this case, the supplier takes all risks and full responsibility for
managing a one-point inventory, while it tries to fulfil the demand occurring at
the retailers (Simchi-Levi et al., 2000). In this situation, it is hard to decide what
is the reason if a network performs poorly: were the forecasts unreliable, or was
the planning inappropriate? If the retailers are not faced with the consequences
of an imprecise forecast directly, they are not inspired to increase their efforts
in accurate forecasting. On the contrary, they even have incentives to distort
the forecasts, and tend to overplan demand and forward too optimistic values
towards the supplier, in order to avoid lost sales. Alternatively, if the retailers
are rewarded for overperforming the plans, then they tend to underestimate the
demand, and hope that the supplier can still fulfil a higher realisation. In both
cases, the selfish distortion of information introduces additional uncertainty into
the demand forecasts, and leads to higher operational costs or higher lost sales.
We have observed both of the above phenomena when working on improving
the performance of real supply chains. In a manufacturing domain, the supply
network under study produces mass products like lighting sources and appli-
ances. The products are marketed and sold on local markets by distribution
centers throughout Europe. The distribution centers are autonomous business
units with their own objectives, business plans and special knowledge of the
local markets, hence they prepare the demand forecasts. On the other hand,
so as to exploit economies of scale, production is concentrated at a focal man-
ufacturer who is responsible for cost efficient production and making inventory
replenishment decisions on behalf of the distribution centers. Operations of
the factory are highly complex (for a description of its production scheduling
problem, see (Dro´tos et al., 2009)), the actual costs of serving the distribution
centers depends on a number of factors among which the quality of received
forecasts is of primary impact. Our other motivating example comes from the
practice of a retail trade service, where local stores are linked to a central ware-
house. The distributed stores are autonomous profit centers responsible for
serving their local customers. They generate forecasts for demand of various
fast moving consumer and durable goods. In contrast, the responsibility for
organizing supply of these goods is at the central warehouse who is connected
to the suppliers and makes appropriate decisions of purchasing, replenishment
and logistics. Similar to the industrial case above, processes and data of central
planning are not known to the distributed retailers. The quality and reliability
of their local forecasts, however, have a major impact on the efficiency of the
overall system.
The literature of supply chain coordination with asymmetric information
usually assumes that either the retailers’ demand forecast or the supplier’s cost
is private information, or rarely both (for an overview, see Egri and Va´ncza,
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2012). In this paper, we consider that both demand forecasts and production
costs are private information of rational agents, and apply the apparatus of
mechanism design theory in order to analytically investigate supply coordina-
tion mechanisms that exhibit generic properties like efficiency, truthfulness or
budget balance1. By exploiting the special properties of the coordination prob-
lem, we construct a truthful and efficient mechanism that can be implemented
in a distributed way. The resulting VMI-type relationship specifies an appro-
priate information exchange and payment scheme that has a straightforward
interpretation. We illustrate the general mechanism with a detailed discussion
of a specialised version, assuming that inventory planning is done according
to the newsvendor model, and explore the operation of this protocol through
computational experiments.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review
the related literature. Next, our general supply network coordination model is
presented in Section 3. We demonstrate the approach for the particular case
of the newsvendor problem in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 discusses potential
applications and extensions of the method and concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
In this section we review the main topics that relate to our paper. Coordi-
nation with contracts aims at constructing such enforceable rules whereby the
overall supply chain performance can be optimised. Game theory determines
the possible results of strategic situations defined by a number of participants,
their own goals and decision options. Mechanism design is a subtopic of game
theory, where the aim is to influence the participants in order to achieve some
preferred outcome. In fact, coordination with contracts is a special application
of this approach in the field of supply chains. However, there are several achieve-
ments of mechanism design which have not been used in this context so far, thus
applying them seems to be a promising research direction. Finally, information
elicitation models such problems, where the participants have private informa-
tion about the probability of a stochastic event. We utilise this approach in our
model assuming that the demand forecasts are only known by the retailers.
Several papers discuss different contractual forms for achieving optimal sup-
ply chain efficiency, called coordination, both for VMI and non-VMI models; for
overviews see (Cachon, 2003) and (Li and Wang, 2007). Yu et al. (2009) study
the VMI supply between a supplier and multiple retailers assuming symmetric
information. They show that the network performance can be improved with
cooperative contracts, but they cannot achieve perfect channel coordination.
Chen and Bell (2011) consider price-dependent stochastic demand, customer
returns and a retailer-supplier pair with symmetric information. They prove
that the standard buyback contract cannot coordinate the channel in this case,
but a modified version with two different buyback prices can, and furthermore,
1For definitions see Section 3.
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it enables profit sharing between the partners. Chen and Xiao (2011) present
a model for a supply chain of short life-cycle products whose prices drastically
decrease in the selling season. In a retailer-supplier chain with symmetric infor-
mation, they develop buyback-based contracts that coordinate the channel and
provide win-win situation for the partners.
As for the asymmetric information models, Liu and O¨zer (2010) compare the
widely used price-only, quantity flexibility and buyback supply contracts when
the demand forecast information is private. They assume that the forecast is
either shared truthfully or not shared at all. It is shown that in this asymmet-
ric situation the quantity flexibility and buyback contracts are not equivalent
any more, since the quantity flexibility contract may not warrant truthful infor-
mation sharing and coordination. Wang et al. (2009) assume price-dependent
demand and that the production cost of the supplier is private information.
The paper studies several contract forms and concludes that none of them can
guarantee truthful information sharing.
Recently, the game theory forums have also become interested in supply
chain applications. An overview can be found in Nagarajan and Sosˇic´ (2008),
which focuses on cooperative models including bargaining and coalition forma-
tion. Yu and Huang (2010) study a network with a supplier, multiple retailers
and symmetric information, but assumes VMI supply. In this case, the retailers
can decide about the retail prices and the advertising investments. The authors
do not intend to coordinate the network, but to develop an efficient algorithm for
computing the Nash equilibrium. Esmaeili et al. (2009) consider a single supplier
single retailer setting with deterministic demand and symmetric information. In
their model the supplier is responsible for the lot sizing decision, therefore it can
be considered a VMI system. Instead of coordinating the channel, their goal is
to characterise the Pareto-efficient cooperative solutions that can be used dur-
ing the price negotiation between the partners. Wang et al. (2004) model a
supply network with one supplier and multiple retailers, and study the setting
as a non-cooperative game with symmetric information. They also consider the
situation when the supplier has some strict production constraints and thus the
retailers must compete for the supply. The paper also presents contracts that
result in unique Nash equilibria and coordinate the network.
Mechanism design theory deals with the problem of constructing the rules
of a game with incomplete (asymmetric) information in order to achieve some
preferred outcome. For an overview of the classic mechanism design theory we
refer to Narahari et al. (2009). One of the main achievements in this field is the
Vickrey – Clarke – Groves (VCG) mechanism, which is the only one in the general
model that can provide efficient and truthful behaviour, but unfortunately, it
cannot guarantee the budget balance property. An other possibility is to apply
the mechanism developed by d’Aspremont, Ge´rard-Varet and Arrow (dAGVA),
which results in efficiency and budget balance. Unfortunately, the dAGVA
mechanism offers a much weaker equilibrium concept than the VCG, and it
also necessitates some common belief about the private information, e.g., a
probability distribution (belief) about a probability distribution (forecast). We
deem the availability of such fine-grained information unrealistic in a supply
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chain setting.
Feldmann and Mu¨ller (2003) model a general multi-echelon supply chain as
a mechanism design problem. They apply the VCG mechanism for inspiring
the partners to disclose their private information truthfully with a central, in-
dependent Supply Chain Management. They also develop a modified version of
the mechanism that assumes that the private information can be later verified
and the untruthful players can be penalised. Garg et al. (2005) investigates
a supply chain optimization model based on the six sigma methodology. In a
decentralised environment with asymmetric information, they assume a central
decision maker that applies a VCG mechanism to optimize the chain and moti-
vate the players to provide the private information truthfully. Gan et al. (2010)
present a model with similar assumptions to ours. They consider a drop-shipping
supply chain, where the supplier is responsible for the inventory management,
but only the retailer knows the precise demand forecast. The realised demand
(including the lost sales) is assumed to be common knowledge, and the authors
apply mechanism design to coordinate the channel. However, there are several
differences between the model of Gan et al. (2010) and our one: (i) we consider
multiple retailers, (ii) our solution does not restrict flexibility with purchase
commitments, (iii) we assume that the production cost is private information of
the supplier, (iv) our model is more general allowing not only the newsvendor,
but any other lot sizing or production planning problem, (v) we allow any kind
of demand forecast, not only high or low random, and (vi) we do not assume
that the supplier has any prior belief about the retailers’ private information.
In our previous work (Egri and Va´ncza, 2011), we studied a supply network
with one supplier and several retailers applying VMI supply with no lost sales
allowed. We developed a coordination mechanism that gives incentives to the
retailers to share the best available forecasts with the supplier, who in turn
determines the production quantity and takes all consequences of any inappro-
priate decision. The difference between the problem examined in that paper
and our present model is that here the output of the mechanism has a direct
effect on the income of the retailers due to the allowed lost sales. For this rea-
son, it is not enough to punish the retailer for an inappropriate forecast, since,
intuitively, it may be worth overestimating the demand and pay penalty, if it
is compensated by the increased income caused by decreased lost sales. In this
case a more sophisticated incentive mechanism is required.
The information elicitation problem consists of an agent with private infor-
mation about the distribution of some stochastic future event, and an other
agent that is interested in this information. It can be considered “a subproblem
of mechanism design, where the mechanism has no outcome to determine” (Zo-
har and Rosenschein, 2008). Such information elicitation problems can be han-
dled by applying so-called strictly proper scoring rules, see e.g., Savage (1971).
We briefly define this instrument here.
Let us assume a set D of possible events, and P, a class of probability
measures over them. A scoring rule S : P × D → R is called strictly proper,
if whenever an event ξ is drawn from the distribution θ, then for any other
θˆ 6= θ : Eθ[S(θ, ξ)] < Eθ[S(θˆ, ξ)]. With other words, the score can be minimised
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(in expectation), if it is parametrised with the real distribution of the stochastic
event.2 For instance, in what follows θ will represent the demand forecast known
by, while θˆ the demand forecast communicated by the retailer (which are not
necessarily the same).
Well-studied examples for strictly proper scoring rules are the quadratic, the
spherical and the logarithmic rules (see e.g., Zohar and Rosenschein, 2008). Ap-
plying such rules to the information elicitation problem is straightforward: if
the agent with the private information is penalized proportionally to a proper
score, it becomes interested in creating and providing as good forecast as pos-
sible. Note that we implicitly assume that the forecast can be created free of
charge; when forecasting or improving the forecast involves some cost, truthful
mechanisms may not exist in general (Zohar and Rosenschein, 2008).
3. Coordinating the supply network
3.1. Requirements
We give first the generic requirements towards mechanisms aimed at coordi-
nating a supply network that consists of autonomous agents. Note that all the
requirements comply with the conditions and expectations of industrial practice.
Hence, we seek mechanisms that satisfy the following desirable criteria:
Distributed implementation. The mechanism should omit any independent
decision maker, thus every decision should be made by the agents. This
implies the requirement for the budget balance property, i.e., all payments
should be distributed among the agents.
Strong solution concept. We require that the game theoretic solution con-
cept should be as strong as possible by avoiding any knowledge or belief of
the agents about each other’s private information. Our mechanism should
guarantee that truthful revelation of the private information is dominant
strategy for the retailers, and the optimal decision of the supplier is also
dominant.
Efficiency. The mechanism should achieve a solution that is optimal according
to a network-wide utility function.
Participation. In order to assure participation of the agents, the mechanism
should guarantee non-negative utility or some additional profit compared
to a baseline solution.
3.2. Supply network model
In this section we discuss a supply network model of n retailer agents and
a supplier agent. The model is an extension of the one presented in Egri and
2Note that in contrast to the usual notation, for convenience, we minimize the score.
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Va´ncza (2011). By omitting the assumption that lost sales are not allowed, we
generalise the model, e.g., the current variant enables the application of capacity
constrained planning as well.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the retailers are homogeneous
in the sense that they have the same possible types of forecast, although this
assumption can be relaxed and the results still remain valid. Retailer i (i =
1, . . . , n) has some private belief (forecast) about the future market demand,
which is denoted by θi ∈ Θ. Furthermore, we denote the vector of the fore-
casts as θ = (θ1, . . . , θn). The demand is satisfied by production done at the
supplier who has, in turn, private information about the cost factors. Since
the exact demands ξi ∈ D realise at some later time, only the forecasts can be
considered when creating a production plan denoted by x ∈ K. The production
plan specifies how the demand should be satisfied, including for example pro-
duction quantities, schedule and distribution. We represent the demand vector
as ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn) and the production cost at the supplier as a function of the
production plan as well as of the realized demands: c ∈ C = { c : K×Dn → R },
which is a private information of the supplier. Note that we do not assume that
an a priori distribution about the private information (θi and c) is known by
the other agents, i.e., we regard a situation with strict incomplete information.
After the demands realise, which are considered to be commonly observable, an
income arises at each retailer i from the sales: vi : K×Dn → R. Note that we do
not restrict the demand at the different retailers in any way; they can be drawn
from non-identical distributions, they can correlate or can be independent.
This model illustrated on Fig. 1 is our general framework that does not
specify how to determine the production plan and how to allocate the costs and
incomes among the agents. The dashed arrows denote information flow, while
the solid ones represent the monetary payments. The variables and functions
inside the agents are private knowledge of the given agent and are unobservable
for the others.
market
ξ
1
ξi ξnv1 vnvi
θ
1
θi θn
c
retailers
supplier
x
Figure 1: Supply network framework.
3.3. Incentive mechanism
According to the classic mechanism design theory, an independent media-
tor, the mechanism is required for observing the agents’ actions, making the
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necessary decisions and after realisation, transferring the payments among the
agents. Some recent research directions aim at omitting this mediator, which
possibility we will study in the next section. For the moment, let us define
the mechanism as M = (f, t1, . . . , tn, ts), where f : Θn × C → K is the choice
function determining the production plan based on the forecasts and the cost
function3, ti : Θ
n × C × Dn → R are the payment functions of the retailers
(i = 1, . . . , n), and ts : Θ
n × C ×Dn → R is the payment for the supplier.
Note two assumptions of this formulation. Firstly, this is a direct-revelation
mechanism, i.e., the strategy of the agents is to share their private informa-
tion (not necessarily truthfully) with the mediator. According to the revelation
principle, this can be done without loss of generality (see e.g., Narahari et al.,
2009). Secondly, we consider that the realised demands and the production plan
are commonly observable for the agents and also for the mechanism, and the
execution of the plan can be enforced at the supplier. Common knowledge of
the agents is also known to the mechanism.
Now we can define the utility—the income minus the cost—for each retailer
and the supplier:
ui(θi, θˆ, cˆ, ξ) = vi(f(θˆ, cˆ), ξ)− ti(θˆ, cˆ, ξ) (1)
and
us(c, θˆ, cˆ, ξ) = ts(θˆ, cˆ, ξ)− c(f(θˆ, cˆ), ξ) (2)
respectively, if the agents’ private information is θi and c, but they communicate
θˆi and cˆ instead. Each agent intends to maximize its own expected utility.
market
�� �i �n
ˇ
�n
ˇ
�i
ˇ
�1
t1
tnti
ˇ
cts
v1 vnvi
f(
ˇ
�,
ˇ
c)
�� �i �n
c
retailers
supplier
mechanism
Figure 2: Supply network in a classic mechanism design setting.
3Although the production planning problem is complex in general, in this paper we disre-
gard computational issues, and assume that an optimal plan can be found for every possible
forecast.
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Figure 2 illustrates this mechanism design model. We are seeking such a
mechanism, wherewith the performance of the supply network as a whole is
optimal. This can be guaranteed, if all the agents disclose their private infor-
mation truthfully, and the mechanism uses an optimal planning choice function.
Let us define these properties formally.
Definition 1. A mechanism M is (weakly) truthful, if truth telling is a domi-
nant strategy for every agent, i.e., it maximizes their expected utility: ∀i,∀θi ∈
Θ,∀θˆ ∈ Θn,∀cˆ ∈ C :
Eθ˜[ui(θi, θ˜, cˆ, ξ)] ≥ Eθ˜[ui(θi, θˆ, cˆ, ξ)], (3)
where θ˜ = (θˆ1, . . . , θˆi−1, θi, θˆi+1, . . . , θˆn), and ∀c, cˆ ∈ C,∀θˆ ∈ Θn :
Eθˆ[us(c, θˆ, c, ξ)] ≥ Eθˆ[us(c, θˆ, cˆ, ξ)]. (4)
Definition 2. A mechanism M is efficient, if the choice function f maximises
the expected social welfare which is the sum of the utilities without the pay-
ments. Hence ∀θ ∈ Θn,∀c ∈ C :
f(θ, c) ∈ argmax
x∈K
Eθ[
n∑
i=1
vi(x, ξ)− c(x, ξ)]. (5)
Now we define the extensively used VCG mechanism for our supply net-
work model, which is not only efficient, but in addition, it is truthful, since the
agents are inspired to share their private information in order to align the choice
function f to their utility.
Definition 3. The mechanism M = (f, t1, . . . , tn, ts) is a VCG mechanism, if
f(θˆ, cˆ) ∈ argmax
x∈K
Eθˆ[
n∑
i=1
vi(x, ξ)− cˆ(x, ξ)], (6)
ti(θˆ, cˆ, ξ) = hi(θˆ−i, cˆ, ξ) + cˆ(f(θˆ, cˆ), ξ)−
∑
j 6=i
vj(f(θˆ, cˆ), ξ), and (7)
ts(θˆ, cˆ, ξ) =
n∑
i=1
vi(f(θˆ, cˆ), ξ)− hs(θˆ, ξ), (8)
where θˆ−i = (θˆ1, . . . , θˆi−1, θˆi+1, . . . , θˆn), furthermore hs and hi are arbitrary
functions independent from the given agent’s disclosed information.
The next theorem shows that if we are looking for an efficient and truthful
mechanism, this excludes the possibility of cost sharing among the agents.
Theorem 1. Let M be an efficient and truthful mechanism. If c, cˆ ∈ C and
θ ∈ Θn such that f(θ, c) = f(θ, cˆ) then ∀ξ ∈ D : ts(θ, c, ξ) = ts(θ, cˆ, ξ).
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Proof. Due to Green and Laffont (1977), in an efficient and truthful mecha-
nism the supplier’s payment has to be in the form of Eq. (8). Since this does
not depend directly on c, only on f(θ, c), this proves the theorem.
The theorem states that if two different cost functions result in the same
production plan, then they also result in the same payment—even if one of them
incurs higher cost for the supplier. The premise of the theorem is not artificial,
for instance the newsvendor model (see Section 4) can involve different fixed
costs for ordering, but the optimal order quantity depends only on the variable
cost, therefore the same optimal lot size may incur different costs.
The case of the retailers is different, since their forecasts can be evaluated
when the demands realise, thus their payments do not have to be in VCG form.
Theorem 2. If f is efficient, ts is defined by Eq. (8) and the retailers’ payments
are
ti(θˆ, cˆ, ξ) = Si(θˆi, ξi) + vi(f(θˆ, cˆ), ξ)− hi(θˆ−i, cˆ, ξ), (9)
where Si is a strictly proper scoring rule and hi is an arbitrary function, then
the mechanism is truthful.
Proof. Since ts is in the VCG form, it is a dominant strategy for the supplier
to share the cost information truthfully. On the other hand, the expected utility
of the retailers become
Eθi [ui(θi, θˆ, cˆ, ξ)] = hi(θˆ−i, cˆ, ξ)− Eθi [Si(θˆi, ξi)], (10)
which can be maximised by θˆi = θi.
3.4. Distributed implementation of the mechanism
In the previous section we have presented a method for defining efficient and
truthful mechanisms for the supply network. Now, our main goal is to omit
the need for an independent mediator which does not comply with our basic
requirements (see Section 3.1). However, at the same time, we are going to
preserve the favourable properties of the system. In what follows, we dissolve
the two reasons that called for the existence of an independent mechanism:
(i) balancing the difference between the agents’ payments, and (ii) providing
efficiency.
Definition 4. A mechanism M is budget balanced, if ∀θˆ ∈ Θn,∀cˆ ∈ C,∀ξ ∈
Dn :
ts(θˆ, cˆ, ξ) =
n∑
i=1
ti(θˆ, cˆ, ξ), (11)
i.e., there is no surplus or deficit for the mechanism, or, with other words, the
total payment is distributed among the agents.
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For the payments defined by Eq. (9) this means that
ts(θˆ, cˆ, ξ) =
n∑
i=1
vi(f(θˆ, cˆ), ξ)−
n∑
i=1
[hi(θˆ−i, cˆ, ξ)− Si(θˆi, ξi)]. (12)
Note that if the functions hi(θˆ−i, cˆ, ξ) are independent of cˆ, then the resulted
payment is in the VCG form, therefore we have an efficient, truthful and budget
balanced mechanism. This is possible, since the private information of the
retailers (the forecasts) can be verified after the demands realise. In contrast, in
general mechanism design problems the three generic properties of truthfulness,
efficiency and budget balance are exclusive (see e.g., Narahari et al., 2009).
This is similar to the result of Nisan and Ronen (2001), who introduced the
concept of mechanisms with verification and proved that it is more powerful
than classic mechanisms. Their task scheduling mechanism however does not
involve stochastic variables and it does not aim at achieving efficiency.
Also note that the constructed mechanism can be implemented without
an independent decision maker: the retailers share their forecasts with the
supplier—just as it would be the mechanism—, and the utility-maximising be-
haviour of the supplier results in the overall efficient outcome. As long as the
production plan is observable for the retailers, the cost can remain private in-
formation of the supplier, since the payments
ti(θˆ, cˆ, ξ) = Si(θˆi, ξi) + vi(f(θˆ, cˆ), ξ)− hi(θˆ−i, ξ) (13)
do not depend directly on cˆ, only on the plan f(θˆ, cˆ). The corresponding dis-
tributed setting is illustrated on Fig. 3.
market
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ˇ
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ˇ
�i
ˇ
�1
t1
tnti
v1 vnvi
�� �i �n
c
retailers
supplier
Figure 3: Supply network in a distributed mechanism design setting.
3.5. Coordinating the network with distributed mechanisms
In this section we specialise the previously developed mechanism for the VMI
supply networks. Let us define the best possible income for retailer i when the
vector of the realised demands is ξ:
v∗i (ξ) = max
x∈K
vi(x, ξ). (14)
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We consider hi(θˆ−i, ξ) = v∗i (ξ) − βi(ξi), where βi is an arbitrary function.
With this definition, the payment becomes
ti(θˆ, cˆ, ξ) = βi(ξi) + Si(θˆi, ξi)− (v∗i (ξ)− vi(x, ξ)) . (15)
This payment function has a rational interpretation that considers VMI a
service. The first term is a payment for fulfilling the demand, the second term
is a compensation for the forecast imprecision, while the last term is a negative
compensation (penalty) for the lost sales that is paid by the supplier, if it cannot
fulfil the demand. The suggested VMI supply protocol is shown by Fig. 4, while
the next section illustrates the approach on a particular example.
Agreeing on
�i(.) and Si(.) Disclosing �^i
Planning production
and producing
Demand realisation �i
Delivery
Payment
Retailer i
Supplier
Figure 4: Timeline of the protocol.
4. Example: the newsvendor model
We consider the basic newsvendor model, where the single decision maker
has to determine the production quantity q, while the demand ξ is a random
variable with known distribution4 (Qin et al., 2011). If q > ξ then the excess
inventory becomes obsolete, while q < ξ causes lost sales. The profit in this
model is rmin(ξ, q)− cq, where r is the retail price and c is the production cost.
It is well known that the optimal production quantity maximizing the expected
profit in this case is:
q∗ = Φ−1(
r − c
r
), (16)
where Φ is the cumulative density function of ξ, and for the sake of simplicity,
we assume now that it is invertible.
Let us now return to the supply network model, where we illustrate on
a particular example how the presented mechanism can improve the overall
performance. We consider n retailers, and assume that the ξi ∈ R demands are
independent and normally distributed random variables with expected values
mi and standard deviations σi. Let Φi denote the cumulative density function
of ξi. In this case the production plan is x = (q, q1, . . . , qn), where q ∈ R is the
production quantity, and { qi : Rn → R } is the distribution plan. This latter
defines the supply quantity qi(ξ) to retailer i such that ∀ξ :
∑n
i=1 qi(ξ) ≤ q, i.e.,
the total quantity delivered cannot exceed the production quantity.
4In this special case, the demand vector ξ has only one element.
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4.1. Order-based purchase
Firstly, we examine the traditional, suboptimal solution, where the retailers
make firm orders qi and pay a w wholesale price for the supplied goods, thus
the payment becomes ti(qi) = wqi. The supplier works in make-to-order mode,
i.e., it produces the quantity q =
∑
qi with c piecewise cost. Since the retailers
are in a newsvendor situation, their optimal order quantity can be determined
by Eq. (16), but using w instead of c, and Φi instead of Φ. Since usually w > c,
the order quantity is lower than the optimal (coordinated) one.
4.2. Coordinated VMI
In the VMI setting, the retailers should disclose their demand forecasts θˆi =
(mˆi, σˆi), and the supplier is responsible for determining the production quantity
q, and distribution plan {qi}. In this case the income of retailer i becomes
vi(qi, ξ) = rmin(ξi, qi), and v
∗
i (ξ) = rξi.
Let us define a payment in the form of Eq. (15). We use the following strictly
proper scoring rule from Egri and Va´ncza (2011):
Si(mˆi, σˆi, ξi) = αi
(
(mˆi − ξi)2
σˆi
+ σˆi
)
, (17)
where αi > 0 is a constant, and furthermore we use βi(ξi) = wξi. Thus the
payment becomes
ti(mˆi, σˆi, ξ) =
{
wξi + Si(mˆi, σˆi, ξi) , if ξi ≤ qi
wqi + Si(mˆi, σˆi, ξi)− (r − w)(ξi − qi) , if ξi > qi . (18)
This can be interpreted in the following way: the retailers should pay (i) for the
supplied quantity, (ii) for the imprecision of the forecast, and (iii) if the supplied
quantity does not cover the whole demand, the supplier must pay a shortage
penalty. These three terms constitute the particular payment elements for the
VMI service (as expressed in a general form by Eq. (15)).
With this payment function the retailers are inspired to truthfully reveal
their private information about the expected values and standard deviations
of the demand forecasts. Now, the expected value of the total demand will
be the sum of the expected values, and since the demands are considered to
be independent, the standard deviation of the total demand becomes
√∑
σ2i .
Furthermore, if the demand at the retailers are normally distributed, the distri-
bution of the total demand will also be normal. If we let Φ denote the cumulative
density function of the total demand, the optimal production quantity can be
determined by Eq. (16). As for the distribution plan, if the total realised de-
mand is less than the produced quantity, the total demand should be fulfilled,
otherwise, the total produced quantity should be distributed among the retailers
in an arbitrary way.
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4.3. Participation
In this section we study the participation requirement, thus we compare
the expected utilities of the partners in the order based and in the VMI cases.
Further on, we will assume that the αi parameters are equal, thus we will
omit its index. This assumption means that the supplier does not discriminate
the retailers, each retailer has the same wholesale price and scoring rule. The
retailers’ utility considering ordering and VMI are
uORDi = rmin(ξi, q
∗
i )− wq∗i , (19)
and
uVMIi = (r − w)ξi − α
(
(mi − ξi)2
σi
+ σi
)
, (20)
where q∗i = Φ
−1
i (
r−w
r ). The expected utilities therefore become
E[uORDi ] = rE[min(ξi, q∗i )]− wq∗i = r
∫ q∗i
−∞ xΦ
′
i(x)dx+ rq
∗
i
∫∞
q∗i
Φ′i(x)dx
−wq∗i = r
∫ q∗i
−∞ xΦ
′
i(x)dx+ rq
∗
i (1− Φi(q∗i ))− wq∗i (21)
= r
∫ q∗i
−∞ xΦ
′
i(x)dx+ rq
∗
i (
w
r )− wq∗i = r
∫ q∗i
−∞ xΦ
′
i(x)dx,
and
E[uVMIi ] = E[(r − w)ξi − α
(
(mi − ξi)2
σi
+ σi
)
] = (r − w)mi − 2ασi, (22)
since E[(mi − ξi)2] = σ2i . Thus the retailer prefers VMI if
α ≤ (r − w)mi − r
∫ q∗i
−∞ xΦ
′
i(x)dx
2σi
. (23)
Definition 5. Let us define the Gauss error function as
erf(x) =
2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt, (24)
and let erf−1(x) denote its inverse.
Theorem 3. The retailers prefer VMI if
α ≤ re
−
(
erf−1(2 r−wr −1)
)2
2
√
2pi
. (25)
Proof. The inverse of the cumulative density function of the normal distribu-
tion can be written in the form
Φ−1i (x) = mi +
√
2σi erf
−1(2x− 1), (26)
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thus applying the Newton – Leibniz formula we get
∫ q∗i
−∞
xΦ′i(x)dx =
∫ Φ−1i ( r−wr )
−∞
xΦ′i(x)dx = −
e
−
(
erf−1(2 r−wr −1)
)2
√
2pi
σi +mi
r − w
r
.
(27)
Substituting this result into Eq. (23) we prove the statement of the theorem.
Since the condition of Theorem 3 depends only on commonly known param-
eters, it can be evaluated by every agents and it can be considered during the
contract negotiation phase.
Let us examine the participation of the supplier now. Its (expected) utility
when ordering is
E[uORDs ] = (w − c)
n∑
i=1
q∗i , (28)
while in the VMI case it is
E[uVMIs ] = 2
n∑
i=1
ασi − (r − w)
n∑
i=1
mi + r
∫ q∗
−∞
xΦ′(x)dx, (29)
where q∗ = Φ−1( r−cr ).
Theorem 4. The supplier prefers VMI if
α ≥ (w − c)
√
2 erf−1(2 r−wr − 1)
2
+
re
−
(
erf−1(2 r−cr −1)
)2
2
√
2pi
√∑n
i=1 σ
2
i∑n
i=1 σi
. (30)
Proof. Using Eq. (26) we get
E[uORDs ] = (w − c)
(
n∑
i=1
mi +
√
2 erf−1(2x− 1)
n∑
i=1
σi
)
(31)
and
E[uVMIs ] = 2α
n∑
i=1
σi−(r−w)
n∑
i=1
mi−re
−
(
erf−1(2 r−cr −1)
)2
√
2pi
√√√√ n∑
i=1
σ2i+(r−c)
n∑
i=1
mi.
(32)
From this two results we get the statement of the theorem.
Note that the condition of Theorem 4 can be evaluated neither by the re-
tailers (since they do not know c), nor by the supplier when n > 1 (since the σi
values are known only by the retailers). However, exploiting that
√∑n
i=1 σ
2
i ≤∑n
i=1 σi, we can relax the bound and the following condition can then be eval-
uated by the supplier:
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Corollary 1 (Sufficient condition). The supplier prefers VMI if
α ≥ (w − c)
√
2 erf−1(2 r−wr − 1)
2
+
re
−
(
erf−1(2 r−cr −1)
)2
2
√
2pi
. (33)
The retailers and the supplier can use Theorem 3 and Corollary 1 respectively
for guaranteeing expected benefit in the VMI compared to the order based
purchase during the negotiation about parameters w and α. Note that this result
is limited to this special model only and we cannot provide such guarantees in
the general case.
4.4. Simulation study
We compared the performance of the order-based and coordinated VMI
models in a series of computational experiments. Fig. 5 illustrates the dif-
ference between the total network utility (UVMI = uVMIs +
∑
uVMIi and U
ORD =
uORDs +
∑
uORDi ) of the two approaches presented in sections 4.1 and 4.2, de-
pending on the number of retailers. We set the price, payment and cost param-
eters as c = 50, w = 70, and r = 100 (note that UVMI is independent of αi,
therefore they are not specified here). The expected value and standard devia-
tion of the total demand was set to m = 800 and σ = 100, and we considered
retailers with identical distributions, therefore their parameters were mi = m/n
and σi = σ/
√
n. Each cost value indicated on the figures in this and the next
subsections are averages made on 5000 simulation runs.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
n
28 000
30 000
32 000
34 000
36 000
U
UVMI
UORD
Figure 5: The network utility in function of the number of retailers.
As it can be seen on Fig. 5, the coordinated VMI is more efficient than the
order-based supply even in the single retailer case due to the elimination of the
double marginalisation. However, when the number of the retailers increases,
risk pooling keeps the optimality of the network, while the uncoordinated ap-
proach quickly deviates from cost efficient performance.
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Figure 6: The network utility in function of the number of retailers and the standard deviation.
Fig. 6 gives further insight into the behaviour of the network when not only
the number of retailers, but also the uncertainty of the forecast increase. The
upper surface on the figure depicts the total utility in the coordinated VMI
case. As we have shown in Fig. 5, the performance in this case is independent of
the number of retailers. However, increasing uncertainty (standard deviation)
of forecasts decreases the utility, as it is expected. The lower surface, on the
other hand, illustrates the total utility of order-based supply. Here, compared to
the coordinated solution, network performance is drastically deteriorated either
with the growing number of retailers or with the increase of the uncertainty of
forecasts. In this case, risk pooling is not at work.
4.5. Sensitivity analysis
Fig. 7 shows the result of changing the α1 parameter of the scoring rule in
Eq. (17) in the single retailer case. Since α1 does not influence the order-based
purchase, the utility is constant then. It can be seen, that when α1 is around
16, both VMI utilities are greater compared to the ordering approach, therefore
both agents prefer VMI. If α1 is approximately 30, the utility of the retailer and
the supplier in VMI equals—however, the retailer obtains lower utility than in
the ordering case.
Fig. 8 illustrates the participation constraints of the network members with
the same c, w and r parameters as before. It can be observed that in the
single retailer case we get the lower and upper bounds that can be seen on
Fig. 7. Furthermore, since the standard deviation of the retailer’s and the total
demand are the same, the estimation of the lower bound is strict. Increasing
the number of the retailers does not influence the upper bound, but decreases
the lower bound in accordance with Theorems 3 and 4. The estimated lower
bound is naturally equal to the lower bound in the single retailer case.
17
10 20 30 40 50
Α1
14 000
16 000
18 000
20 000
22 000
24 000
u
us
VMI
u1
VMI
us
ORD
u1
ORD
Figure 7: The agents’ utilities in function of α1.
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Figure 8: Upper, lower and estimated lower bounds on α.
5. Discussion and conclusion
We have presented a general mechanism design model for coordinating a sup-
ply network of a single supplier and multiple retailers, and proved a negative
result for cost sharing. The mechanism that was discussed first in an abstract
form has also been specialised by taking practical characteristics of supply net-
works into consideration. In light of the results we suggested to interpret VMI
as a flexible service. It was shown that the coordination protocol needs no
independent decision maker for guaranteeing truthfulness and efficiency of the
network. We also have proved that the actual cost structure of the supplier
can remain private information, i.e., the mechanism respects the asymmetry of
sensitive cost information.
As discussed above, these generic properties are essential in any real appli-
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cation. However, before transferring the results into practice we suggest consid-
ering the following issues:
• The production plan in the model is very general, and can contain sev-
eral aspects of the practical problems, such as production quantities, pro-
duction time, production technologies, and distribution plan, to name a
few. Even the retail price can be part of the plan, thus the model allows
price-dependent stochastic demand as well. Some examples of the different
planning problems are the classic newsvendor (Section 4), the newsvendor
with costly additional production possibility (Egri and Va´ncza, 2011), the
newsvendor with additional production involving fixed setup cost (Egri
and Va´ncza, 2012) and the multi-period uncapacitated lot sizing (Va´ncza
et al., 2008).
• While in the general model the whole production plan and the demand
vector is assumed to be common knowledge, this is usually not necessary
in the specific applications. By exploiting the structure of vi and x, this
assumption can be often relaxed. In the example presented in Section 4,
where vi depends only on demand ξi and the supplied quantity qi, the
payment is constructed in such a way that ξi and qi have to be known
only by retailer i and the supplier. This property facilitates the practical
applicability of the model.
• Although some kind of cost and profit sharing would be favourable, un-
fortunately in general networks with private information this cannot be
guaranteed. Furthermore, even positive utilities for the agents are not
assured. However, usually the combination of the widely used wholesale
price and a relatively small compensation for the forecast imprecision can
coordinate the network. Simulations and scenario analyses based on his-
torical data and beliefs can help evaluate and tune the parameters.
In our opinion the conceptual apparatus and research methodology of mech-
anism design can have a fundamental role in coordinating networked production.
Within the context of the work presented in this paper, we see some research
directions particularly worth exploring. Hence, the presented two-tier network
can be extended to more complex structures, where the centralised decision
making is less realistic. One can also explicitly consider more complex planning
problems that cannot be solved optimally, and the approximation distorts the
favourable properties of the mechanisms (see Nisan and Ronen, 2001). In such
cases interactive planning protocols seem to be applicable. As for distributed
decision making, in the context of supply chain design we have recently taken
the mechanism design approach to suggesting a solution of the safety stock
placement problem in decentralised supply chains consisting of a number of
autonomous stages (Egri, 2012).
Finally we note that the practical implementation of the proposed VMI sup-
ply service calls for new legal instruments, contract types that come along with
tedious processes of elaboration and introduction. What is more, it also needs
19
a shift in the general managerial attitude towards taking more responsibility for
the information communicated to business partners. Against all such difficul-
ties, one can but hope that the potential mutual merits of coordination makes
the approach attractive on the long run.
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